Cryptographic mechanisms and deployment limits

This page describes the implementation and its configuration boundaries. It does not establish the security of operator-supplied credentials, imported keys, or external services.

Built-in mechanisms

Purpose	Implementation
Tenant API keys and secrets	core/tenant/tools/generator/app.go reads crypto/rand.Reader; keys use 16 random bytes and secrets use 24 random bytes. Random-source failure stops generation.
Persistent service tokens	PersistentServiceToken generates 48 random bytes with Java SecureRandom, stores them in a deployment-specific file, and compares tokens with MessageDigest.isEqual. Explicit operator-provided tokens require separate entropy assessment.
Invitation-link encryption	AESUtil uses AES-256-GCM, a 12-byte IV from SecureRandom, and a 128-bit tag. It accepts a 64-character hexadecimal key. Key ownership and rotation are separate from algorithm/key-length selection.
Model credential encryption	RSAUtil generates 2048-bit RSA key pairs through Java's cryptography provider. Its existing PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption format is retained for client compatibility; imported key files require operator review. The ECB component of Java's RSA transformation name does not describe an AES-ECB operation.
Request signing	Python hmac/hashlib and Java's cryptography APIs implement the standard HMAC-SHA-256 signing paths.
Casdoor JWT signing	On fresh initialization, Casdoor v2.67.0 creates cert-built-in before importing templates. Without separately supplied token certificate files, its RS256 certificate uses a newly generated 4096-bit RSA key pair. Applications reference that certificate by name.

The Casdoor templates do not supply a signing private key. Keep initDataNewOnly = true so restarting or upgrading does not overwrite existing identity data. Removing a sample from a template does not rotate a certificate already stored in a persistent database. Manage existing signing keys through Casdoor's certificate and application administration, taking active sessions and JWT verification into account.

External compatibility paths

The Link plugin's MD5 authorization path is selected by an explicit OpenAPI header default of Authorization: MD5; it is not the general request-signing default. Other provider-specific request formats retain MD5/HMAC-SHA-1 components for interoperability. Do not select these formats for new internal authentication protocols. Use an authenticated HTTPS endpoint, protect the provider credential, and prefer a stronger protocol when the provider supports one. Compatibility with a provider does not by itself establish a security-standard exception.

The WeChat adapter retains the platform's SHA-1 signature and AES-CBC message format. Its active callback path verifies and decrypts inbound messages using the request's timestamp and nonce. The outbound helper now uses SecureRandom for its 16-character random plaintext prefix; the current callback does not call that outbound helper. The prefix is distinct from the caller-supplied protocol nonce. Changing the randomness source preserves the wire format; changing the signature or cipher requires a compatible platform protocol change.

Transport and forward secrecy

The Compose service network and example gateway routes use HTTP. Deploy public endpoints behind a correctly configured TLS terminator, and keep internal service networks private. Perfect forward secrecy depends on the actual TLS endpoint, protocol and negotiated cipher suite; it is not enforced by the supplied HTTP Compose configuration. HTTPS used to download project releases does not establish forward secrecy for application traffic.

References and tests

• Casdoor v2.67.0 initialization

• Casdoor built-in certificate

• Casdoor certificate generation

• python docker/astronAgent/casdoor/test_certificate_config.py checks that sample configuration contains no static private key and that application certificate references resolve to the upstream-generated certificate.

• WXBizMsgCryptTest checks reply framing, encryption/decryption compatibility, and rejection of a mismatched nonce signature. The standard backend test suite runs it. From console/backend, a focused run is:

  mvn -pl hub -am -Dtest=WXBizMsgCryptTest -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false test